Ion Beam Applications S.A Recalls

Hazard: It was identified that eh Universal Beam Triggering Interface (UBTI) is disabled in the Therapy Safety System (TSS) configuration. In this condition, the TSS does not interrupt the beam delivery if the Healthy Signal from an external gating device is lost. This may lead to a risk of mistreatment when external gating devices are used.

Hazard: Safety Parameters Verification Mechanisms can be deactivated in clinical runtime

Hazard: Temporary deactivation of collision detection for Forte Robotic Patient Positioning System occasionally experiences issues

Hazard: Irradiation is not interrupted when some C230 Accelerator Control Unit critical parameters are outside of the defined tolerances

Hazard: There is a risk of mistreatment as irradiation is not prevented when some safety parameters are out of tolerance.

Hazard: The patient positioning system can perform motions in unexpected directions, creating the potential for crushing of the patient between the patient positioning devices.

Hazard: First layer of Uniform Scanning treatment fields is sometimes irradiated with incorrect Scanning Magnet setpoints resulting in the field size may be smaller than expected and the irradiated area may receive more dose than prescribed

Hazard: When resuming from a beam pause, the Proton Therapy System does not verify whether the beam range has not been manually modified during the pause and is still the prescribed one. Therefore, if an operator manually modified the range during a pause, there is a risk that a portion of the treatment beam after the resume is delivered with an error in range

Hazard: Proton Therapy System (PTS) software can be started in the clinical environment (clinical user) while some processes are still running in the test environment (tcs user). Initiating the startup of the clinical processes in the environment is not prevented even if some processes of the test environment (tcs) are still running. It may lead to situations where the system is using test processes without notifying the clinical user. If the versions of the processes are different between both environments, this could have an impact on patient treatments.

Hazard: Users may be misled by the popup message displayed by the Proton Therapy System when the Oncology Information System appears disconnected, may cause mistreatment

Hazard: if the user forgets to select the trigger input manually while beam gating is prescribed for the patient, the proton irradiation will be delivered without gating. If the beam is not gated as prescribed, the treatment field may be delivered with an error in position

Hazard: Signature from the user is necessary to proceed with specific actions in the Proton Therapy System (PTS). IBA became aware that the PTS does not accept user names with more than ten characters. It is an issue when the user has no other choice than resuming an aborted treatment field based on the overall delivered dose displayed on the Dose Counter Electronic Unit (DCEU). User s signature is required to perform this action. If the signature contains more than ten characters, the user will not be able to complete the aborted treatment field. An additional issue applies to Electronic Medical Record (EMR) centric sites and may increase the probability of not being able to complete an aborted treatment field. It is not possible, in a new session, to resume from a local partial archive if the Patient Positioning System (PPS) position has changed. If the user captures the PPS position at every session in the Oncology Information System (OIS) just after the setup process, the prescribed PPS position is changed for the next session in the OIS. This includes the partial continuation session. Therefore, when comparing the prescribed PPS position between OIS and local database, the PTS sees a difference and rejects the local partial archive. This problem forces the user to resume the interrupted irradiation based on the overall delivered dose displayed on the DCEU instead of resuming from the full details of the interrupted beam.

Hazard: IBA became aware of an issue to resume aborted irradiations because the plan to complete the treatment cannot be loaded.

Hazard: There is a risk of detachment of the Compact Gantry Rolling Floor.

Hazard: Gantry rotation or proton irradiation can be allowed even if apertures or accessories are not correctly positioned in snout 300x400 or snout XL. This can lead to risk of crushing for patient and/or user, and risk of mistreatment for the patient.

Hazard: Correction vector confirmation message is lost if access point is changed after sending the correction vector. As a result, the patient will be treated in the setup position or treatment position instead of the corrected position.

Hazard: IBA is conducting a voluntary recall to address a PTS (Proton Therapy System) software issue and to reduce the risk related to this issue.

Hazard: IBA is recalling to provide information through a Safety Notice to reduce risk for maintenance technicians during ion source replacement.

Hazard: IBA is initiating this recall to notify its customers that the use of non-IBA accessories and/or third party equipment or unauthorized modifications to an IBA medical device may pose a safety risk.

Hazard: IBA is initiating this recall to notify its customers that the use of non-IBA accessories and/or third party equipment or unauthorized modifications to an IBA medical device may pose a safety risk.

Hazard: IBA is initiating this recall to address an issue identified with AdaPTinsight software and to reduce risk related to this problem.

Hazard: When switching from Pencil Beam Scanning treatment mode to Uniform Scanning treatment mode, the tuning setpoints of the scanning magnets are not always taken into account when the proton beam is requested. The mismatch between the setpoint and feedback leads to an error message. Depending on user action, two scenarios are possible: 1. The user resumes the treatment field without analyzing the cause for the error message. This may lead to under-irradiation. 2. The user reboots the Scanning Magnets Power Supply Electronic Unit. This may lead to delay in patient treatment and the patient may need to be re-aligned, which leads to an additional X-ray dose.

Hazard: The internal configuration of the electrometers and the Real-Time control boards of the Dekimo Scanning Controller is not checked before each patient treatment.

Hazard: There is a risk of misalignment of the patient when using treatment plans with multiple isocenters.

Hazard: An accessory (range shifter, ridge filter&) can be improperly inserted in snout 300x400 with one rail only and the proton therapy system can still operate.

Hazard: Range for the same energy could be different depending if the layer is the first layer of the irradiation plan or not.

Hazard: IBA identified incorrect screw holes depth in graphite block 8 with respect to the degrader

Hazard: Software issue

Hazard: Recall is being initiated to address on-site software installations not being performed consistently with IBA standard operating procedures.

Hazard: It has been observed during testing that there could be clinically non-negligible amount of dark current (a well-known physics effect observed in cyclotron) in Pencil Beam Scanning (PBS) treatment mode when system is not irradiating between layers.